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James W.  Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom 
Life  expectancy  at  current  mortality  rates  in  Western  Europe, the  United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan exceeds 75  years; in Japan 
and the Scandinavian countries (and in some states of the United States, such 
as Hawaii and Minnesota) life expectancy for women is around 80 years. Many 
demographers, gerontologists, and others believe that life expectancy will con- 
tinue to rise slowly until it reaches an upper limit of perhaps 85 years. Fries 
(1980) has helped  popularize this idea, but as adumbrated below, numerous 
others have contributed to it. Demeny (1984), in making long-term population 
forecasts for the World Bank, assumed that even by the year 2100 there would 
be no country with a life expectancy above 82.5 years. 
Other researchers are skeptical about the existence of an upper limit to life 
expectancy, at least at an age as early as 85. They foresee continuing and per- 
haps even accelerating progress in reducing mortality rates at all ages, includ- 
ing the most advanced ages (Manton, Stallard, Tolley 1991). Some projections 
suggest that the life expectancy  of  the current generation  of children in the 
United States might be  100 years or more, if progress in reducing  mortality 
rates continues over the next century (Vaupel and Gowan 1986; Guralnik, Ya- 
nagishita, and Schneider 1988.) 
If life expectancy remains at about current levels, demographers can make 
fairly long-term forecasts of the future size of the elderly population with rea- 
sonable accuracy. Everyone who will be more than  60 years old in the year 
2050 has already been  born; if  age-specific death rates remain  more or less 
constant and if migration rates are low or predictable, then the current popula- 
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tion  can  be  projected  forward  to  estimate  the  population  of  the  elderly  up 
through the middle of the next century. 
Suppose, however, life expectancy rises so that children alive today live 100 
years on average, instead of 75 years. The elderly population will increase dra- 
matically in size and the oldest-old population of those above age 85 will ex- 
plode in number (Ahlburg and Vaupel 1990). 
Hence, theory and evidence concerning the prospects for longer life expec- 
tancy are of fundamental relevance in assessing the impact of population aging. 
In particular, major issues in the economics of aging hinge on projections of 
the old and oldest-old populations. These issues include trends in  (I) health- 
care demand and costs, (2)  the financial soundness of social security systems 
and pension plans, (3) individual, corporate, and governmental decisions about 
the age of retirement, and (4) the nature and extent of intergenerational trans- 
fers of resources. 
A major biomedical uncertainty lies at the core of the disagreement between 
those who foresee life expectancy leveling off at about 80 or 85 years and those 
who predict  more radical increases to a century or more. Does the force of 
mortality (i.e., the age-specific hazard of death) (1) sharply and inexorably rise 
for the typical individual to extremely high levels around age 85 or (2)  increase 
after age 85 at about the same rate or even at a slower rate than before age 85, 
with the likelihood that the rate of progress being made in reducing the force 
of  mortality among the very old will be of  the same order of magnitude as the 
rate of progress being made among the younger old? 
The first perspective implies that life spans are limited. Individuals may dif- 
fer somewhat in their maximum potential  life spans, with some individuals 
having a potential of 100 years and others a potential of 75 years. On average, 
however, the typical individual’s  longevity  is unlikely  to exceed the  natural 
limit of  85 years or so that has prevailed  for millennia.  Most of  those who 
adhere to this perspective believe that continued progress in reducing mortality 
rates up to age 75 or so is likely to be made, so that death before age 75 will 
become  rare. Consequently, life expectancy  will  approach  the length of  the 
typical maximum life span, i.e., about 85 years. Eventually, some extraordinary 
breakthroughs  may be made that permit humans to live beyond their natural 
life spans, but when such breakthroughs will occur, if ever, is uncertain. 
This general point of  view  is often illustrated with diagrams showing an 
increasing rectangularization  of  survivorship curves or showing bell-shaped 
distributions, centered around age 85, of what Fries (1983) describes as “natu- 
ral death (due to senescent frailty).” Such survivorship curves and distributions 
of deaths imply that little or no progress can be made in reducing death rates 
after age 80 or so. 
The  second  perspective  implies  that  the  force  of  mortality  rises  fairly 
smoothly to very  advanced  ages exceeding  100 years  or more-there  is no 
sharp increase for the typical individual around age 85, and there may even be 
some gradual lessening of the rate of  increase after age 90 or so (as implied 81  Longer Life Expectancy? Evidence from Sweden 
by the power function or the logistic function used, instead of an exponential 
function, in some models of mortality). Furthermore, there is no discontinuity 
around age 85 in the rate of progress that is likely to be made in reducing the 
force of mortality, so that substantial reductions in mortality rates will probably 
be achieved at all ages. Consequently, life expectancy will continue to gradu- 
ally but steadily increase and may rise to 90, 95, or even longer by  the year 
2050. Major biomedical breakthroughs  are likely over the course of the next 
century, although the exact nature and significance of these breakthroughs can- 
not now be foreseen: these breakthroughs  may result in some acceleration in 
the rate of progress made in reducing the force of mortality, so that a life expec- 
tancy of well over  100 years, less than  100 years from now, cannot be ruled 
out. In  contrast  to the  limited-life-span  paradigm, this  might  be  called  the 
mortality-reduction paradigm. 
Given the current state of knowledge, no judicious researcher can claim to 
know for sure which of these two paradigms is more correct-or  whether some 
combination  of  them  or some entirely  different  perspective  will  eventually 
prove to be true. Furthermore, each of the two paradigms has numerous vari- 
ants that have not yet been conclusively shown to be inconsistent with reliable 
empirical evidence. 
Broadly speaking and with many caveats, the limited-life-span paradigm can 
be  associated  with  the  stream  of  research  done by  Pearson  (1923), Pearl 
(1923),  Clarke  (1950),  Bourgeois-Pichat  (1952,  19781,  Comfort  ([  19641 
1979), Ryder (1975), Hayflick  (1977, 1980), Sacher (1977), Keyfitz (1978), 
Kohn (1982), and their colleagues. The most prominent recent advocate and 
popularizer of  this general perspective is Fries (1980, 1983, 1984; Fries and 
Crapo 1981; Fries, Green, and Levine 1989); useful reviews are also provided 
by  Rosenfeld  ([  19761 1985) and Gavrilov  and Gavrilova  (1991). These re- 
searchers generally assume that there are biological barriers to longer life ex- 
pectancy; in contrast, Olshansky, Carnes, and Cassel (1990) stress practical 
bamers that may effectively limit life expectancy to values less than 85 years 
or so. Whether the barriers are practical or genetic is, however, rarely explicitly 
addressed: in much of  the gerontological literature it is simply accepted as a 
stylized fact that natural or senescent death implies that mortality rates cannot 
be substantially reduced at advanced ages. Harman (1991) and Lohman, Sank- 
aranarayanan, and Ashby  (1  992) provide two recent examples of the strength 
and persistence of this point of view. 
The possibility that the mortality-reduction  paradigm may be more correct 
is implied by  most of the process models of mortality developed from Gomp- 
ertz  (1825) onward.  This viewpoint  has  been  cogently  argued  by  Manton 
(1982; Manton and Soldo 1985; Manton and Woodbury 1987;  Myers and Man- 
ton 1984;  Manton et al. 1991) and is supported either explicitly or implicitly by 
Schatzkin (1980), Schneider and Brody (1983), Peto, Parish, and Gray (1986), 
Vaupel and Owen (1986), Vaupel and Gowan (1986), Schneider and Guralnik 
(1987), Poterba and Summers (1987),  and Rowe and Kahn (1987). 82  James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom 
The  key  reason  that  the  controversy  between  the  limited-life-span  and 
mortality-reduction paradigms has not been resolved is that there is relatively 
little reliable data on mortality rates over age, time, and sex among the oldest 
old  (i.e., those over aged 85). Indeed, it is remarkable  how  little  is known, 
considering the rapidly  increasing population  at advanced ages and the high 
life-table probability,  approaching  50 percent for females in some countries, 
of survival past age 85. 
Very few published human life tables extend past age 85, and the population 
and death counts that are available for the oldest old tend  to be suspect. As 
reviewed (and bewailed) by  numerous demographers (including Shryock and 
Siege1 1976; Mazess and Forman 1979; Rosenwaike 1981; Horiuchi and Coale 
1983; Spencer 1986; Coale and Kisker  1986, 1990; Kannisto  1988), various 
kinds of gross errors are common in reported age-specific deaths and popula- 
tion  sizes  above  age  85.  These  errors-such  as  age  heaping  caused  by 
rounding off of ages to the nearest age divisible by five or ten, the tendency of 
some older people to exaggerate their ages, the fact that a relatively few errors 
in misclassifying younger people as very old people can swamp actual counts 
of very old people, or failures to remove the deceased from population registers 
so that the dead appear to survive eternally-may  represent systematic biases 
across populations. Hence it may be impossible to reduce these errors by the 
usual  statistical expedient  of  examining  many  data sets and either  formally 
or informally averaging them. It is consequently essential that large, reliable 
databases on oldest-old human mortality be assembled and analyzed. 
The most reliable data on mortality rates up to the most advanced ages over 
a long period of time pertain to Sweden. Excellent data exist for Sweden since 
1750; superlative data have been archived since 1895. The published Swedish 
data that  are readily available  are highly  accurate, but even these data have 
some deficiencies at advanced ages. In particular, much of the published data 
is smoothed by actuarial methods after age 90 or so, and the most widely avail- 
able mortality rates are based on aggregated data on several years of age and 
time rather than on single years of age and time. Furthermore, the data, once 
published, have not been revised as new information (from censuses or cohort 
death counts) has become available. 
Using unpublished information in the archives of Statistics Sweden, one of 
us  (Lundstrom)  is in the process  of  meticulously  verifying, correcting, and 
computerizing the death counts and population counts needed to estimate mor- 
tality rates at advanced ages in Sweden from 1750  to 1992. For this article, we 
made use of  a nearly completed version of the Lundstrom database for 1895 
to 1990. A few minor changes may be made to a few of the death and popula- 
tion counts in this database, but the version we used is undoubtedly extremely 
close to the final version. 83  Longer Life Expectancy? Evidence from Sweden 
3.1  Force of Mortality at Ages 85,90, and 95 
Figure 3.1 plots the force of mortality for Swedish females at ages 85, 90, 
and 95, from 1900 through  1990. Other ages between 80 and 100 show simi- 
lar patterns. 
The force of  mortality, also known as the hazard or intensity of  death, is a 
measure favored by demographers  to capture the level of  mortality. It is de- 
fined, at age x and time y, by 
ds(x, y)ldx 
S(X> Y> 
p(x) = - --,  y=y,+x, 
where s(x, y) is the proportion of the cohort born x years ago that is surviving 
at time y,  and yo  is the time the cohort was born. The Swedish data are available 
by single years of age and time, so a discrete approximation must be used to 
estimate p. We used the standard approximation 
where D(x,  y)  represents the number of deaths among the cohort of people who 
were between  exact ages x - 1 and x on January  1st of  year p and N(x, y) 
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Fig. 3.1  Force of mortality for females, ages 85,90, and 95: Sweden, 19W90 84  James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom 
members of this cohort attain exact age x (i.e., celebrate their xth birthday) over 
the course of year y. Also note that in-and-out migration is ignored: net migra- 
tion is negligible in Sweden after age 80. 
Population sizes are small, especially at age 95, so the trajectories in figure 
3.1 show  considerable  random  fluctuation. The overall  trends,  however, are 
clear. There was little progress in reducing the force of mortality at advanced 
ages before 1940 or 1950.  Afterward, the force of mortality declined consider- 
ably, even at age 95. At age 85, the force of mortality declined from about .2 
to about .l.  At age 90, the decline was from a level of about .3 to about .2. An 
absolute decline on the order of magnitude of .l,  from about .4 to about .3, is 
also apparent at age 95. 
As shown in figure 3.2, the trends for Swedish males are roughly similar, 
although less dramatic. It is clear that the force of mortality for very old males 
in Sweden was substantially lower in  1990 than it was in  1900, although the 
reduction  was  less than  for females and  the  levels  of  mortality  are  higher 
for males than for females. At each age, the absolute decline for males was 
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Fig. 3.2  Force of mortality for males, ages 85,90, and 95: Sweden, 1900-90 85  Longer Life Expectancy? Evidence from Sweden 
3.2  Average Annual Rates of Progress in Reducing Mortality Rates 
To  summarize the overall pattern of reduction, table 3.1 presents  average 
annual rates of progress in reducing the force of mortality for Swedish females 
and males over successive 20-year time periods and for people in their 60s and 
70s as well as octogenarians, nonagenarians, and centenarians. 
For males and for females, the average level of the force of mortality over a 
decade of time and age was calculated as follows: 
The fis are used to standardize the age composition of the population: we cal- 
culated the h's  from the population of Sweden in the 1980s: 
1989 
N(x) = c N(x, y)  . 
*=I980 
The values of  p(x, y)  were calculated as described above. If  the death count 
equaled the  population  count, then  the  standard  approximation  p.  = 2 was 
used. Occasionally, at ages greater than  100, it was impossible to estimate 
for some specific year, because no one was alive at that age and year. In such 
cases, the p.  term was dropped from the numerator and a corresponding correc- 
tion was made in the denominator. The average annual rate of progress in re- 
ducing the force of mortality was then calculated using 
Table 3.1  Average Annual Rates of Progress in Reducing Mortality Rates by 
Age Category and Time Period 
Time Period 
1900-09  to  1920-29  to  1940-49  to  1960-69  to 
Sex  Age Category  1920-29  1940-49  1960-69  1980-89 
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Table 3.1 indicates that progress has been made in Sweden in reducing the 
force of mortality at all ages after 60 for both  males and females. Estimated 
rates of progress fluctuate erratically for centenarian males, probably because 
there are so few observations for this category, but even so the general trend is 
toward a reduction in mortality rates. For females and for younger age catego- 
ries,  the picture  is clear: mortality  rates  among the elderly  are declining  in 
Sweden and at a faster pace in recent decades than in the first decades of the 
century. 
For males in the most recent time period, the rate of progress is roughly the 
same-about  half a percent per year-for  men in their 60s, 70s, ~OS,  and 90s. 
For  females in the most recent  time period,  the rate of  progress  is about  2 
percent for women in their 70s and half as much for women in their 90s. Note, 
however, that the rate of progress for women in their 80s is the same, 1.6 per- 
cent, as that for women in their 60s. 
If rates of progress in the first 20 years of the century are compared with the 
most recent 20-year period,  it is apparent that there has been a considerable 
acceleration of rates of  progress. The acceleration is greater for females than 
for males. The acceleration  is  also  greater  in  older age categories  than  in 
younger ones, at least in the age categories, below age  100, where there are 
substantial numbers of observations. 
The overall acceleration in rates of progress and the greater acceleration at 
older ages may reflect actual changes on the individual level: the elderly today 
may be healthier than in the past, and they may be receiving better health care. 
A supplemental explanation  was suggested by  Vaupel, Manton, and Stallard 
(1979). Progress in reducing mortality rates  at younger ages makes it more 
difficult to make progress at subsequent ages if  the persons whose lives are 
saved are frail and vulnerable. In effect, progress in reducing cohort mortality 
rates at younger ages masks the true rate of progress (controlling for composi- 
tional changes) at older ages. However, as mortality rates in an age category 
decline, this effect diminishes in importance, resulting in an apparent accelera- 
tion in rates of progress. 
3.3  Lexis Maps of Force of Mortality 
Another way to summarize data concerning a surface of demographic rates 
over age and time is to present a Lexis map, i.e., a shaded contour map of the 
surface (Vaupel, Gambill, and Yashin 1987). Figure 3.3 displays a Lexis map 
of  the  force of  mortality  for Swedish females at  ages  80-111  from  1900 
through 1990. Figure 3.4 displays a corresponding map for Swedish males. 
The data available to us include death counts by year of birth as well as by 
current age and year. Furthermore, the data include population counts of those 
attaining a specific age in some year (e.g., the number of those who celebrated 
their 85th birthday  in  1970) as well as counts of the number of  people at a 
given age on January  1st of a given year. Hence it is possible to estimate the 87  Longer Life Expectancy? Evidence from Sweden 
Fig. 3.3  Force of mortality for females 80-111:  Sweden, 1900-90 88  James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom 
Fig. 3.4  Force of mortality for males 80-111:  Sweden, 1900-90 89  Longer Life Expectancy? Evidence from Sweden 
force of mortality for triangular categories of age and time. Let q = D/N be 
the ratio of the death count to the population at risk, in one of these triangles. 
To convert this into an annual probability of death, let 
q*= 1  -(1  -q)2. 
Then, analogous to the formula used earlier, the force of mortality can be esti- 
mated by 
= -ln(l  -  4”). 
The four shades of  gray in figures 3.3 and 3.4 represent four levels of this 
estimated force of mortality. The light gray tones along diagonals above age 
100, terminated by  a black triangle, generally represent cohorts with one re- 
maining member: the force of mortality is zero until this person dies. 
Consider the age at which the force of mortality for females crosses the level 
of  .125, as shown in figure 3.3. Until  1945 or so, this age is around 81; by 
1990, the age is up around 87. One interpretation of this is that an 87-year-old 
Swedish female in  1990 was  as healthy  (at least in terms of  probability  of 
death) as an 8  1  -year-old Swedish female in the first four decades of the twenti- 
eth century. The age at which the force of  mortality for females crosses the 
level of .250 increases by  about five years from a level fluctuating around 89 
to a level of  94. Despite substantial  statistical noise,  a shift upward  is also 
apparent at the level of  .5, and there is also a clear increase in the maximum 
age attained. The record longevity is 11  1 years, attained by the grandmother of 
an employee of Statistics Sweden. 
For males, as shown in figure 3.4, the surface of  mortality rates is higher 
than for females. Furthermore, the upward shift is less substantial at the .125, 
.25, and .5 levels and in the maximum age attained. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
there has been a definite shift, on the order of three years or so. As noted above, 
this can be interpreted as the result of a downward shift in mortality curves or, 
alternatively, as a delay in the aging process: elderly Swedish males in  1990 
can be considered to be three years “younger” (in terms of their risk of death) 
than Swedish males of  the same age in the first part of  this century. 
3.4  Remaining Life Expectancy 
A final perspective on the decline in oldest-old mortality rates in Sweden is 
presented in table 3.2. For the various decades from 1900 until 1990, the table 
gives, for males and females, the age at which remaining life expectancy  is 
two years and the age at which remaining life expectancy is five years. 
The numbers given are based on decennial life tables for each decade. The 
age-specific mortality rates, for single years of age, that form the basis of these 
life tables were calculated using the following standard formula: 90  James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom 
Table 3.2  Age at Which Remaining Life Expectancy is Two Years or Five Years 































Males  Females 
80.5  81.7 
80.7  81.8 
81.2  82.0 
80.9  81.5 
81.6  82.3 
81.8  82.9 
82.5  84.0 
83.2  85.8 
83.7  86.7 
’=\” 
where, unlike above, D(x,  y) now represents the number of deaths within a year 
of time of people who attained exact age x in year y, and N(x,  y)  represents the 
number of people who attain age x in year y. 
Note in table 3.2 that, for both males and females and when remaining life 
expectancy is either two years or five years, there was little net change between 
the decade  1900-09  and the decade  1930-39.  From the  1930s to the  1980s, 
however, the shifts were substantial. For males, the age at which two years of 
life expectancy are left increased by almost four years, from 94.4 to 98.1. For 
females, the corresponding shift was close to five years, from 95.4 to  100.1. 
The age at which remaining life expectancy is five years increased for males 
by  almost three years, from 80.9 to 83.7. For females, the increase was five 
years, from 8  I .5 to 86.7. 
As suggested earlier, one interpretation of these shifts is that the process of 
aging has been slowed or delayed in Sweden such that elderly Swedish men 
are effectively three or four years “younger” than they used to be and elderly 
Swedish females are five years younger. Caution is required because these fig- 
ures are based entirely on mortality statistics, with no information about mor- 
bidity or disability. Nonetheless, treated judiciously, this perspective suggests 
that  certainly  mortality,  and  perhaps  health  more  generally,  is plastic  even 
at the most advanced ages. It has been possible, at least in Sweden, to lower 
the  force of  mortality  and to  significantly  postpone  death  even  among  the 
oldest old. 91  Longer Life Expectancy? Evidence from Sweden 
3.5  Discussion 
Swedish life expectancy has been among the very longest in the world for 
many decades. If progress can be made in Sweden in lowering mortality rates 
at advanced  ages, then the contention  that oldest-old  mortality  rates cannot 
be significantly  reduced  seems questionable.  Using highly  reliable data, we 
presented four perspectives on mortality changes in Sweden since 1990  among 
the elderly. As shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2, the force of mortality at ages 85, 
90, and 95 has substantially declined, especially  since  1945 or so, and more 
for females than for males. As shown in table 3.1, rates of progress in reducing 
mortality rates among the elderly have accelerated over the course of the cen- 
tury  and from the  1960s to the  1980s ran  at an average  annual rate of  1-2 
percent for females and half a percent for males. As shown in figures 3.3 and 
3.4, the ages at which the force of mortality attains the levels of .125, .25, and 
.5 have shifted upward substantially since 1945 or so, by  about five years for 
females and three years for males. Finally, as shown in table 3.2, the ages at 
which  remaining  life expectancy  reaches  two years  or five years  have also 
shifted upward, by  about  five years for females and three or four years for 
males, These four perspectives are consistent with each other. They indicate 
that the belief  that oldest-old mortality rates cannot be significantly reduced 
is incorrect. 
A variety  of  other strands of evidence, reviewed by  Manton et al. (1991), 
point in the same direction.  Most of  this evidence pertains  to small special 
populations  followed for short periods  of time or is based on the results of 
sophisticated  mathematical  modeling.  The evidence  from Sweden is highly 
reliable, pertains to a sizable national population followed since 1900, and is 
so straightforward that it does not have to be smoothed or filtered through a 
statistical model. 
The available evidence, taken together, suggests that, if historical rates of 
progress in reducing mortality rates continue to prevail in the future, newborn 
children today can expect to live about 90 years on average. If, as health and 
biomedical knowledge develops, progress accelerates so that age-specific mor- 
tality rates come down at an average rate of about 2 percent per year, then the 
typical newborn today in developed countries will live to celebrate his or her 
100th birthday. 
Whether progress in reducing mortality rates will continue at historical lev- 
els or even accelerate is, of  course, an open question. Even more uncertainty 
envelops an equally important question: if our children survive to become cen- 
tenarians, what will their health be like during their extra life span? Will the 
added years be  active, healthy  years or years  of  decrepitude,  disability, and 
misery? The answer to  this question  is central  to forecasting  the impact of 
population aging on health and social needs and costs, on retirement decisions 
and policies, and on other questions in the economics of  aging, but very little 
is currently known about what the answer might be. 92  James W.  Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom 
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Comment on Chapters 2 and 3  PeterDiamond 
When  David  Wise  invited  me to discuss  these  two papers, he said that  he 
wanted me to think about the policy implications of the findings. He said the 
same to Michael Hurd. Mike and I have divided up the policy world. He will 
talk about the relationship to Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI). I will 
talk about the relationship  to Disability  Insurance  (DI). Since there are two 
other chapters about long-term care (LTC), we will not relate chapters 2 and 3 
to that topic. 
First, a simple overview of what these papers are about. Let M(a,t)  be the 
aggregate mortality rate as a function of age and time. We are interested in (at 
least) three things. How would you project M into the future? How would you 
examine the impact of medical interventions on M? How might you relate M 
to other issues such as the demand for LTC, the supply of DI recipients, the 
supply of  labor? 
There are two ways to go about projections.  One is to examine aggregate 
statistics, whether  for M  or for mortality  by  cause, examine the  history  of 
trends, and think about extrapolation on that basis. This is what the Vaupel and 
Lundstrom chapter (chap. 3) is about. The second is to estimate mortality haz- 
ards on individual data and simulate to produce an aggregate projection. This 
is what the Manton, Stallard, and Singer chapter (chap. 2)  is about. 
One can interpret a major part of the Vaupel and Lundstrom paper as asking 
the following  question.  If one wants  to project M(a,t) based  on selecting a 
functional  form and estimating  the parameters  on aggregate  data, what is a 
sensible (a priori) form for M?  In particular, is it sensible to have a form consis- 
tent with declines in M  at all ages that do not have an asymptotic minimum 
level of M bounded away from zero? The alternative is to assume that M stays 
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very large at ages within the range we currently observe, that the asymptote, 
should the projection  be extended indefinitely  into the future, should not be 
zero. 
The primary evidence brought directly to bear on this question is the pres- 
ence of a trend in mortality rates at advanced ages. If there is an asymptote, it 
would appear that we are not sufficiently  close to it for it to show up in the 
data, and therefore for it to play a role in functional form selection for estima- 
tions which are then used for projections out to the moderate term (100 years?). 
The second topic in chapter 3 is the review of the basis for thinking that the 
mortality function should have an asymptote with a sharply rising section in 
the mid-90s. I have not read any of the literature being discussed. Without that 
background, I would hope that argument would be spelled out. 
The Manton, Stallard, and Singer paper is of the micro simulation sort. It 
relates to Vaupel and Lundstrom’s chapter in two ways. One is that disaggre- 
gated (by cause and individual) death rates should aggregate up to be consis- 
tent with our best sense of the shape of the aggregate mortality function. Sec- 
ond, the debate on functional form for the aggregate function is also relevant 
for the selection  of  functional form for disaggregated  estimation.  Unfortu- 
nately, in my  reading  of  the Manton  et al. paper, I could not tell how time 
entered in the functions to be estimated, so I could not tell how it related to the 
Vaupel and Lundstrom paper. 
The methodology of  chapter 2 involves two forms of  disaggregation,  if I 
have this right. One is by cause of death. The second comes from using individ- 
ual data and introducing additional health variables into the estimation process. 
For example, if  one has data on blood pressure  at various times, one could 
estimate  the  stochastic  time  interdependence of  blood  pressures  and  the 
(lagged) stochastic structure of the relationship  between  blood pressure and 
mortality rates by cause. This is an extremely attractive way to proceed, since 
it opens up a way  to address the additional questions I identified at the start. 
Disability is also identified as a powerful forecasting variable. 
For example, if one wanted to consider the possible effects of a continued 
improvement in blood pressure  and in the incidence  of  heart  attacks in the 
population, one would proceed in different ways with the two different simula- 
tion models at hand. One might simply make an assumption on the extension 
of the trend in heart attack mortality. One would need to make some assump- 
tion (such as no effect) on the implication of the projected trend on other death 
rates. Alternatively,  one could have an estimated relationship between  blood 
pressure and different mortalities by cause and age and so derive the impact of 
blood pressure decline on all of the mortality rates by cause. Of course, one 
would  then be making a different  assumption:  namely, that the interactions 
associated with the intervention are like those of the historical trend. That is, 
lowering blood pressure further is similar in its effects to previously caused 
improvements. If  one is seeing improved dietary habits spreading to more of 
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which may have side effects or other differences in effects from the historically 
given decline. That is, if the historical decline is diet driven, then the effects of 
diet on mortality by  cause that do not go through blood pressure will be par- 
tially captured by blood pressure and partially captured by trend. The projec- 
tion will be implicitly picking up some of this. 
This is part of a familiar tension. Both macro- and micro-based projections 
involve assumptions, differently described assumptions. Which basis is more 
reliable for projection depends in part on the quality of the different assump- 
tions. That is why it will remain useful for research to project in parallel on 
both macro and micro levels. 
What about the relation of chapter 2 to DI? One might have a database that 
allowed estimation of DI receipt as a function of health variables. If these same 
health variables were part of this mortality estimation, one could then derive a 
DI-receipt simulation model. (It would also be necessary to recognize that var- 
ying administrative interpretations of DI standards have been a major cause of 
fluctuations in disability rates.) One would also need the mortality of DI recipi- 
ents, which might use the basic model or might recognize that DI receipt was 
a  variable  of  independent  econometric value  in  predicting  mortality.  (One 
would also want a model of return to the labor force which is additional.) Get- 
ting more  ambitious,  one observes that  retirement  is often related  to health 
variables. Combining this relationship  with both the health evolution  model 
and the mortality model, one has a potentially improved basis for projecting 
labor force and OASI benefits.  More generally,  I find this approach very at- 
tractive. 
What about DI policy and the sense of the findings coming from Manton et 
al.’s paper? For this, I need to back up and talk about the place of  DI in our 
panoply of programs. (In part 1  am drawing on my paper with Sheshinski [Dia- 
mond and Sheshinski, in press].) We have lots of programs to provide income 
to people with low earnings. There are welfare programs. There is UI. There 
is SSI. There is OASI. There is DI. There are also private  programs  (soup 
kitchens) that provide some benefits to the destitute. What is a potentially use- 
ful pattern here, and how do demographic changes affect how we might want 
to combine these programs as well as structure them? That is, changing demo- 
graphics  might  call  for changing the  parameters  of  an  individual  program 
(thought of in isolation). For example, if health and labor supply improve “in 
proportion” to life expectancy, then one might want to simply change the pa- 
rameters of OASI by  changing, in proportion to life expectancy, the “normal 
retirement age,” the age of eligibility for early benefits and, the age of eligibil- 
ity for benefits independent of earnings. If  life expectancy, health, and labor 
supply do not change in proportion,  then one might contemplate  a different 
pattern of change in the parameters. 
Similarly, the desired relationship between programs might change because 
of demographic changes. We have programs that are universal (along the lines 
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a relatively easy to measure target variable (age as a basis for OASI, at least 
after the start-up period,  so that documentation  of  age happens  well before 
eligibility). We have programs that are based on difficult to measure variables 
(such as DI based on the ability to work). Programs also differ in the cost of 
verification, Akerlof ( 1978) has written about the improved trade-off between 
distributional goals and disincentive costs that come from such targeted pro- 
grams. But targeted programs  are subject to both  type I and type I1 errors. 
Stern (1982) has written about the choice between a targeted and a universal 
program as a function of the disincentives elements and the magnitude of the 
errors. Diamond and Sheshinski (in press) have written about combining both 
types of  programs,  incorporating  awareness of  both types of errors and dis- 
incentives in the choice of parameters for the two programs. 
Workers become eligible for OASI at age 62. Workers remain eligible for 
DI until age 65. Thus there is a three-year overlap period during which workers 
are eligible for both  programs.  With the delay in the normal retirement  age 
(but not the age of  eligibility for OASI), the overlap period  will  grow. The 
overlap period is an accident of legislative history. Moreover the relative pa- 
rameters of the two programs are a result of the adaptation of the parameters 
of the retirement program to generate a disability program, not the result of a 
conscious optimization over both programs. This should probably change. In 
particular, growing life expectancy together with health and labor supply im- 
provements, which, I think, will not improve in proportion, will increase the 
range of differences in outcomes across people and so increase the importance 
of coordinating both programs. However, such a move is in the opposite direc- 
tion to pressures in the United States and in many other countries. 
In particular, following the Chilean example, there is a move toward forced 
savings programs that do not provide insurance for variation in the length of 
working life. Provision of such insurance is likely to have increased importance 
in the future, with growing life expectancy at older ages. The extent to which 
this is important is related to the impact on life expectancy of the sort of events 
that lead to early retirement. It would be wonderful to have a full-fledged esti- 
mation of the parameters of such interaction along the lines of Manton et a1.k 
chapter. Longer life expectancy, labor supply held constant, is a source of rela- 
tively lower living standard and so, on utilitarian lines, a reason for the receipt 
of income redistribution. The link with disability is more complicated because 
of the correlation with life expectancy. That is, recognizing that the groups of 
people who are more likely to receive disability are more likely to die young 
is relevant for designing programs which have given ex ante redistribution ele- 
ments. I think that a detailed calculation of  the conditional probabilities is im- 
portant for design of  disability  programs relative to retirement  programs, A 
similar approach may be a fruitful basis for design of  LTC insurance as well, 
but that is a separate subject. 98  Comment on Chapters 2 and 3 
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Comment on Chapters 2 and 3  Michael D. Hurd 
Understanding  the determinants of the mortality risk of the elderly  and how 
those determinants  will change over time is important for public policy. For 
example, the future costs of  the Social Security retirement  program depend 
directly on length of life following retirement: an underestimate of life expec- 
tancy at age 65 of, say, 10 percent translates directly into an underestimate of 
costs of  10 percent in steady state. 
Because the elderly consume medical services at about four times the rate 
of the nonelderly, the amount we spend on health care depends in an important 
way  on the  life expectancy  of  the elderly, although  the  link  is complicated 
because of the bunching of medical expenditures just before death. Trends in 
medical expenditures make this particularly important: health-care consump- 
tion rose from 9.1 percent of  GNP in 1980 to 12.2 percent in 1990,  because of 
sustained inflation in medical services in excess of  CPI inflation and because 
of sharp increases in age-specific use per capita. Future increases in medical 
prices and in age-specific use will interact with demographic changes in a way 
that can produce very large increases in total consumption of medical services 
and, of  course, in the costs of  the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
In this comment I will focus on the variability of forecasts. I will use the 
forecasts of Manton, Singer, and Stallard (chap. 2), official forecasts from the 
Social Security Administration,  and results from the Vaupel and Lundstrom 
paper (chap. 3)  to argue that our uncertainty about the course of mortality risk 
is great, in the sense that the range of mortality outcomes spanned by the fore- 
casts implies a wide range of tax and transfer outcomes. 
Uncertainty in Population Forecasts. 
The Office of  the Actuary of the Social Security Administration  forecasts 
both the elderly and nonelderly populations from assumptions about the future 
course of age-specific mortality rates, rates of immigration, and fertility rates. 
The rates  are based  on expert opinion:  they  are not based  on a theoretical 
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model that has been fitted to historical data. Table IIC.1 has forecasts of the 
elderly population in 2040, life expectancy at age 65, and the elderly depen- 
dency ratio (the ratio of the number of elderly to the number aged 20-64)  for 
three alternative assumptions about the course of mortality rates.' Alternative 
I1 is considered to be the best estimate, and it typically is used as the basis for 
forecasts of  the cost, revenues, and balances of the trust funds. It embodies a 
27 percent decline in age-specific mortality rates by 2040. Alternatives I and 
I11 are based on mortality rate declines of  13 and 40 percent, respectively, and 
forecasts  of  the  trust  funds that  use  these  alternatives are often  thought  to 
bound the possible outcomes. 
Alternative I has 7.5 percent fewer elderly in 2040 than the baseline (alterna- 
tive 11),  and alternative  111  has 8.6 percent  more.  Under  alternative 111,  life 
expectancy is 11-13  percent higher than under alternative 11, so that in steady 
state costs would be 11-13  percent higher. 
The baseline forecast of  Manton et al. gives 51.7 million elderly in 2040 
(table 2.5). I do not know of  any way  to analyze the causes of the difference 
between this number and the Social Security baseline (69.6 million); rather I 
would like to focus on the variation in forecasts. The forecast of Manton et al. 
is substantially outside the interval bounded by alternatives I and 111.  Further- 
more, Manton et al. give simulations in which their risk factors are controlled. 
If  the mean  of each risk factor is put at its optimum but the variance is not 
changed, many  individuals  will have risk  factors  that are far from optimal. 
Nonetheless, controlling the mean in this way will increase the number of el- 
derly to 79.9 million by 2040 (table 2.5),  an increase of 54 percent over base- 
line. If, in addition, the variance of the risk factors is put to zero, so that the 
risk factors of each individual are at their optima, Manton et al. forecast 127.5 
Table IIC.1  Number of Elderly, Life Expectancy, and Elderly Dependency Ratio 
Life Expectancy at 
Age 65 
Year and  Mortality  Number  Dependency 






na  31.9  15.0  18.8  .2  1 
13  64.4  15.6  19.4  .33 
27  69.6  17.2  21.2  .39 
40  75.6  19.3  23.5  .47 
Source: OASDI Board of Trustees (1990). 
1. The table has the Social Security area population, which differs slightly from the U.S.  popula- 
tion because it includes some additional geographic areas such as herto Rico. The alternatives 
differ by assumptions about fertility and immigration as well as mortality rates, but variation  in 
the fertility and immigration assumptions will have only marginal effects on the elderly population 
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million elderly by 2040, an increase of 246% over baseline (table 2.5).  These 
give, of course, enormous variation  in the number of elderly compared with 
the forecasts of  the Office of the Actuary. 
A way to judge the importance of the variation is in terms of  its effects on 
Social Security tax rates. The Trustees’ Report has a sensitivity analysis, which 
gives  the  ceteris  paribus  change in  net  trust  fund income resulting  from a 
change in mortality assumptions. Moving from alternative I to alternative 111, 
which  increases the elderly population  by  17 percent, requires  that taxes in- 
crease by  about 0.85 percent of taxable payroll each year from now to 2039 
(OASDI Board of Trustees 1990, table B2, SO-year balance). Taking the base- 
line  of  Manton  et al. and assuming  a constant  response  of  payroll  taxes  to 
percentage  changes in  the elderly population,  I estimate that under the first 
forecast of  Manton et al. (mean risk factors at their optimum) the tax would 
have to be 2.7 percent of taxable payroll greater than under baseline; under the 
forecast that puts the variance of risk factors to zero, the tax would have to be 
7.3 percent of taxable payroll greater. The latter figure is rather large, about a 
SO percent increase in the payroll tax. While the former figure, an increase of 
2.7 percent, may seem moderate, it should be kept in mind that it is only mod- 
erate because it is levied over each of the next SO  years: if the tax is not levied 
until the baby-boom generation begins to retire, it will be much greater. Fur- 
thermore, it is greater by  a factor of  3.2 than the variation in the tax rate be- 
tween alternatives I and 111. 
Although  Vaupel and Lundstrom  have  no population  forecasts, the basic 
point of their paper is the same as that of Manton et al’s: our uncertainty about 
the upper bound of the future elderly population is great. If the Fries hypothesis 
is correct,  life  expectancy  can  increase  but  not  much  beyond  those  figures 
given in my table IIC. 1 under alternative 111. Vaupel and Lundstrom argue that 
Fries is wrong and that there is no theoretical limit to life expectancy: even if 
the risk factors in Manton et al. are put to their optima, their population fore- 
casts could be too low. In this event, the effects on the Social Security retire- 
ment system and the health-care system would be practically  devastating. 
Population Forecasts and Changes in Risk Factors. 
In the forecasting model of Manton et al., the actual population could differ 
from the forecast population  for at least two reasons: the choice of the level 
and variance of the risk factors used in the simulations could be different from 
actual future risk factors, or the model of mortality risk may not give the right 
change in mortality risk for a change in risk factors because it is incorrectly 
specified. The preceding  section discussed how the forecasts vary as the risk 
factors vary. In this section, I will give an example that shows how difficult it 
is to find a correctly specified model. If the model is not correctly specified, 
we should be even more uncertain about the future elderly population because, 
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still be uncertain about the course of mortality risk. The example will consider 
the relationship between mortality rates and exercise. 
Suppose, as in Manton et al., we want to use epidemiological  (nonexperi- 
mental) data such as the Framingham data to find the effects of exercise and 
cholesterol on mortality rates. Following them, we would fit a vector ARMA to 
the risk factors (exercise and cholesterol) and a mortality hazard which would 
depend on the risk factors and possibly on their past levels. Other risk factors 
such as age, sex, and marital status would also be used, but they are not neces- 
sary for this example. This system could be used to forecast values of exercise 
and cholesterol and, hence, mortality rates, and, therefore, it could forecast the 
population. We  could get good forecasts if other unobserved determinants of 
risk factors and mortality evolve as they have in the past. 
Now suppose we want to forecast the response to a change in a risk factor, 
say, exercise. As in Manton et al. this would involve changing a risk factor and, 
through simulation, finding the new forecast population. To illustrate the range 
of outcomes, I introduce two health models. 
In health model A, exercise does affect mortality risk because it affects un- 
measurable healthiness, which, in turn, affects mortality risk. People choose 
exercise levels by  whim. In model B, exercise has no effect on healthiness or 
on mortality risk. However, individuals with differing levels of healthiness face 
differing costs of exercise: exercise is unpleasant or even painful for unhealthy 
individuals, and they would tend to exercise less. We would, therefore, observe 
a negative correlation between exercise and mortality under either model, but, 
of course, the effects in the population of requiring everyone to take up exer- 
cise would be completely different: under model A mortality risk would de- 
cline; under model B it would be unchanged. 
A statistical method for controlling for unobserved healthiness can be based 
on panel data: the individual  effect  (healthiness)  can be accounted  for in a 
number of ways, such as by taking deviations from individual means in a linear 
model or by modeling the distribution of the individual effect in a nonlinear 
model. For simplicity, take the case of a linear model. Then, model parameter 
estimates will depend on variation in the time path of exercise at the individual 
level and any associated mortality events. Under model A, those individuals 
who decrease their exercise level will eventually have higher mortality rates, 
whereas individuals  who do not decrease their exercise levels will have un- 
changing mortality rates. If healthiness is static, under model B any variation 
over time in exercise would not be associated with any variation in mortality 
rates. The two models predict different relationships between the time paths of 
exercise and mortality. That difference can be used to identify the true model, 
which will lead to the correct prediction about the effects of changing exercise 
on mortality risk. 
However, the point of the model of Manton et al. is that risk factors evolve, 
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mortality risk  would  vary as healthiness  varies, but, on average,  individuals 
who choose declining levels of  exercise would have increasing mortality rates. 
Under model B, individuals whose healthiness fell would reduce exercise, and 
their mortality rates would also rise. Thus, the empirical outcomes would be 
the same under either model A or B: unchanging exercise is associated with 
unchanging mortality rates; falling exercise is associated with increasing mor- 
tality rates. Without further specification of what would amount to a structural 
model, no empirical methods could separate the models, and so we should not 
have much confidence that changing exercise in the population  will have an 
effect on mortality risk. 
This example is a gross simplification of the model of Manton et al., but it 
does, I believe, illustrate why I have reservations about their assessment of the 
effects of altering risk factors. I do not mean to be overly critical because this 
is the same kind of empirical problem economists face with nonexperimental 
data, and everyone knows how difficult it is to find convincing results. 
Conclusion 
The paper by Manton, Singer, and Stallard, the paper by  Vaupel and Lund- 
strom, and  the  population  forecasts by  the  Social  Security  Administration 
should lead practically anyone to the conclusion that the actual future elderly 
population could well be very different from the forecast population. The dif- 
ference is large as measured by the variation in the impact on the Social Secu- 
rity retirement system. Although I have no quantitative measures, I am sure the 
effects on health-care  expenditures  and on the Medicare and Medicaid pro- 
grams vary in a similar way. How policy should react to the uncertainty is not 
at all obvious, but because it will be practically catastrophic to the retirement 
and health-care financing systems should the actual population reach the upper 
levels of the forecasts, we should be thinking now of  policies to cover those 
cases. Of particular importance is reducing the rate of growth in medical costs, 
because of the interaction of medical costs with the elderly population.2 
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